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　 The United States developed atomic bombs and dropped them in Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki.  It emphasized how destructive atomic bombs are.  It touted the 
development of nuclear weapons and their use as a “success.”
　 Immediately after the bombs were dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the 
Japanese government said to its people that there is nothing scary about the “new 
type of bomb” if people act exactly as they are told to.  However externally, 
through the Swiss government, it denounced the use of the atomic bombs as a 
violation of international law on the grounds that it is more atrocious than toxic 
gas.
　 The Japanese government employed provisions of the Convention (IV) 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed in 1907 in The Hague 
to criticize the atomic bombing. Annex to the Convention’s “Regulations 
respecting the laws and customs of war on land” says in Article 22 that “the right 
of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.” Article 23 
said that it is forbidden to employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause 
unnecessary suffering.” Citing these provisions, the Japanese government 
condemned the United State that “these bombs, which the United States recently 
used, surpass toxic gas and all the other weapons that are forbidden because of 
their indiscriminate and atrocious nature and strictly demanded that it immediately 
abandon the use of such brutal weapons.
　 As the Allied occupation of Japan started, the media began to report the fact 
that people were suffering and being killed even one month after the bombing. 
People had to struggle with “unnecessary suffering” which against international 
law.1
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　 Australian journalist Wilfred Burchett wrote an article entitled “The Atomic 
Plague” in the London Daily Express on September 5, 1945. He wrote as follows: 
“In Hiroshima, 30 days after the first atomic bomb destroyed the city and shook 
the world, people are still dying, mysteriously and horribly – people who were 
uninjured in the cataclysm – from an unknown something which I can only 
describe as the atomic plague.”2
　 Brigadier General T.F. Farrell, deputy military commander of the Manhattan 
Project, reacted to the media coverage at a news conference in Tokyo on 
September 12, 1945.  The New York Times on September 13, 1945 ran a story 
headlined “No Radioactivity in Hiroshima Ruin.” It said that Farrell “reported 
tonight after a survey of blasted Hiroshima that the explosive power of the secret 
weapon was greater than its inventors envisaged, but that he denied categorically 
that it produced a dangerous, lingering radioactivity in the ruins of the town or 
caused a form of poison gas at the moment of explosion.”3
　 Farrell made these remarks at this news conference under the influence of 
Stafford Warren, Chief of the Manhattan Project’s Medical Section, who had 
studied the impact of radiation exposure and estimated the extent of radioactive 
contamination of the area of atomic bombing. Commenting on an estimated 
impact of the bombing, Warren said that mid-air explosion of an atomic bomb, 
like the bombs dropped in two Japanese cities, would cause destructive blasts and 
that blasts and gamma and neutron beams have lethal effects.  He also said that 
dangerous fissionable materials just went up into the substratosphere and were 
dispersed by the blowing wind.  His conclusion was that people may return to 
their homes as the city would not be contaminated with dangerous substances.4 
Warren had explained this viewpoint to Farrell back in September 1945.  But the 
statement by Farrell was inaccurate.  According to many statements by A-bomb 
survivors in concerted lawsuits, their health problems were caused by exposure to 
atomic bomb’s residual radiation.
　 In the early 1950s, the U.S.  Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC) 
surveyed people who entered the cities after the atomic bombings.  However, this 
project ended in 1953 without enough research.5  The U.S. government continued 
to deny or play down the impact of residual radioactivity or internal exposure in 
its official statements.  But it is now clear from relevant U.S. documents that what 
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the U.S. government has given as its official view has no credibility.
　 The question here is why the U.S. government surveyed the survivors of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and of the Marshall Islands even though it had officially 
underestimated the impact of radiation exposure.
　 It is because the U.S. sought to collect data that would be useful in case of a 
World War III.  Colonel A. W. Oughterson, Medical Corps, U.S. Army, Pacific, 
described the significance of the “study on casualties caused by the effect of 
atomic bombs” in a letter he sent to Guy Denit on August 28, 1945.  He said that a 
study of the effects of the two atomic bombs used in Japan was very important to 
our country (the United States).  He also said that such a unique opportunity may 
not come again until the next world war.6  In June 1950, the U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC) announced that ABCC would continue the study of Japanese 
atomic bomb survivors, namely A-bomb survivors in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  It 
said, “The Japanese survivors make up the only group of human beings in the 
world who have been exposed to an atomic bomb burst. For this reason, the 
medical findings of the ABCC have important significance for scientists and for 
military and civil defense planning in the United States.”7 This statement made it 
clear how important the radiation effect research was to military and civil defense 
in the United States.  In fact, a pamphlet distributed as part of the civil defense 
project said that the chance of surviving a nuclear attack is higher than you might 
think, because the power of the bombs is limited, citing that a little more than half 
of the population within a mile, or 1.6 km from the epicenter in Hiroshima still 
alive.  It even argued that radiation from atomic bombings was not as horrible as 
blasts or heat, except for explosion under water or on the ground, adding that the 
danger of first exposure to radiation would last only one minute.  It is appalling 
that this pamphlet emphasized the fact that more than half of the population in a 
given area survived instead of noting the fact that nearly half of the population 
died.  In its propaganda campaign, the U.S. totally ignored the effect of residual 
radiation that was emitted one minute after the detonation.
　 The U.S. government covered up the radioactive contamination while 
conducting thorough survey on people in the Marshall Islands and the U.S. service 
personnel after the revelation of massive radioactive impact shown in the crew of 
Daigo Fukuryu Maru by the radioactive fallout triggered by a hydrogen bomb 
experiment in Bikini Atoll on March 1, 1954.  The U.S. government launched 
another nuclear experiment at Nevada test site for civil defense purpose, inviting 
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civilians and media in May, 1954.  Then, they launched a new propaganda 
campaign to ask citizens to buy nuclear shelters for radioactive fallout.8
　 In 1957, the U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower set up his science advisory 
committee known as the Gaither panel to consider constructing nuclear shelters in 
case of radioactive fallout.  On November 7, 1957, the panel submitted to the 
president a classified report entitled “Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear 
Age.”  It recommended the funding $22.5 billion to construct new nuclear 
shelters.9 Eisenhower said he would not publish the report’s estimate on the 
grounds that he feared that the public might panic. Vice President Richard Nixon 
argued that security of the U.S. hinges not on civil defense but on active defense 
using nuclear deterrence, saying there was no difference between 30 million 
deaths and 50 million deaths from the viewpoint of the nation’s survival.  They 
knew that there was no means of protecting citizens if nuclear war breaks out. 
That is why they adamantly argued for “nuclear deterrence”, which was supposed 
to prevent nuclear war by means of threats.10 This is a notion that nuclear weapons 
could be used as a card in international politics because of its significant role as 
deterrent.  However, I believe that such rhetoric that has been proliferated is the 
real problem, rather than nuclear proliferation itself.
　 The policy of depending on the nuclear umbrella, the theory of nuclear 
deterrence and the use of nuclear energy are serving as sources of pro-nuclear 
notions. Therefore many nuclear victims have been kept out of the public eye. 
This has been made possible by the fact that the U.S. government that developed 
and used atomic bombs not only boasted of these “successes”, but also succeeded 
in covering up their brutal impact and damage, clearly in violation of international 
law.
　 The influence of nuclear weapons or radiation effects was underestimated and 
propagated by politicians and scientists who have been involved in nuclear 
weapons development or in human radiation experiments for the development of 
radiation weapons.  To take the first modest step toward abolishing nuclear 
weapons, it is important to make known to the public that  the nuclear weapon is 
not something that merely exerts destructive power or political card to threaten the 
other side but that it brings about tragic consequences indiscriminately, especially 
on growing children and unborn children.
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